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Petitioner Prosper, Inc. respectfully submits its reply brief on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. PROSPER5S REPLY TO THE BOARD'S STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
The Workforce Appeals Board (hereinafter "Board") in its Brief (hereinafter B. 
at )5 states that it "supplements and corrects" Prosper Inc.'s (hereinafter "Prosper") 
Statement of Fact. Prosper responds to the Board's supplemental facts as follows: 
• In paragraph 1, the Board states "The employer provides online classes to 
customers in a variety of subjects." (B. at 2, paragraph 2). At the time of appeal, 
Prosper did not provide online classes. 
• In paragraph 3, the Board states that Prosper "believed the claimant was missing 
appointments." (B. at 4, paragraph 3). Iversen testified she missed appointments 
(R. at 101, lines 15-19). It is inaccurate to correct the record to state that Prosper 
"believed" these conditions were occurring. 
• In paragraph 7, the Board states a hearing was scheduled for "August 7, 2006". 
(B. at 5, paragraph 7). The hearing date was April 11, 2006 (R. at 069). 
• In paragraph 7, the Board states "The employer was sent notice of the hearing 
and an appeals brochure which instructed the employer to contact the witnesses 
and make sure they would be able to participate in the hearing."(B. at 5, 
paragraph 7). This statement is not supported by the record. There is no 
brochure in the record except in the Board's briefs. 
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• In paragraph 11, the Board states "Under Utah employment law, the claimant 
must be shown to have been at fault in the discharge. Without proving any of the 
complaints to have been true, the employer could not prove just cause." This is a 
conclusion of law and not a statement of fact. 
II. THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD MISAPPLIES THE LAW. 
Hypothetical: After a long week at work, Julie is looking forward to dining at 
her favorite restaurant. Upon being seated, she is disappointed to see that the server 
named "Chet" is assigned to her table. She hopes that the service is better today. Once 
again she is disappointed. In fact, if anything, the service is worse. Chet is chewing 
gum, he mixes up orders, and above all, he sneezed on the table. Not wanting to make a 
scene, on her way out Julie mentions her dissatisfaction to the Hostess. 
If in this hypothetical Chet had intentionally poured coffee on Julie, and Chet 
was terminated for his actions, then the restaurant may need to substantively prove that 
Chet poured coffee on Julie. By contrast, if the complaint that Julie lodges is the ninth 
customer complaint in the last two months, the restaurant is being injured by Chefs 
conduct and the restaurant can terminate Chet for poor performance and customer 
complaints without proving the particulars of each and every complaint lodged against 
him. 
With this in mind, a review of the Board's brief establishes that the Board views 
this case as one wherein the particulars of each complaint need to be established by 
competent evidence. The Board rejects the existence of the complaints as hearsay and 
2 
awards benefits on the grounds the employer failed to substantively prove that the 
claimant performed poorly. 
This case has been brought before the Court before. In its previous decision, the 
Court deemed that the evidence of the existence of the complaints was admissible non-
hearsay: 
This evidence was not hearsay because it was not introduced for the truth of 
the matter asserted—i.e., that the customer complaints were true—but simply 
to prove that the complaints had been made. Cf. Kelley v. Airborne Freight 
Corp., 140 F.3d 335, 346 (1st Cir.) ("We agree that a customer complaint offered 
to show, for example, that a decisionmaker had notice of the complaint, rather 
than to prove the specific misconduct alleged in the complaint, is not barred by 
the hearsay rule."), cert, denied, 525 U.S. 932, 119S. Ct. 341, 142 L. Ed 2d 281 
(1998). Prosper offered evidence of customer complaints about Iversen not to 
establish the truth of any particular complaint, but simply to show she was the 
object of numerous customer complaints and thus an employee who did not 
perform satisfactorily, [emphasis in Brief] (B. at 7). 
Though the Board acknowledges in its brief the language quoted above, the Board in a 
misapplication of the law states "The Board did consider on remand, as it did originally, 
that the employer had in fact received customer complaints about the claimant. What the 
Board found was that the employer did not prove the substance of the customer 
complaints was true." (B. at 7). 
It is reversible error, as it was previously, for the Board to conclude "The 
employer's allegations rest solely on hearsay evidence contradicted by claimant and 
uncorroborated by other competent evidence." (Decision on Remand, R. at 347). The 
complaints were introduced to prove that the complaints were made, not to prove that 
they were true. As observed by the Court, "That the complaints are made is the real 
problem from the employer's standpoint—not whether the complaints are "true" in the 
3 
usual sense." Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, j^l 3 
fn.4, 168 P.3d 344; (R. at 331, fn 4). 
Though the Board uses a large portion of its brief to cite to other jurisdictions, 
the cases cited by the Board either sought to introduce the evidence to establish proof of 
the matter asserted, or were found to be hearsay. In this case, however, the Court has 
already ruled the evidence of the existence of the customer complaints is not hearsay.1 
As the existence of customer complaints is not hearsay, this case is like 
Rodriguez v. Filene 's Basement, Inc., 905 A.2d 177 (Ct. App. 2006) wherein the court 
affirmed the ALJ's denial of benefits on the grounds that "the three documented 
instances of Ms. Rodriguez's 'rude and disrespectful conduct toward [Filene's] 
customers during a seven-month period...clearly are acts that adversely affect a material 
employer interest, i.e., good customer relations." Id. at 180. 
Similarly, in Cameron v. Commissioner of Labor, 15 A.D.3d 722, 788 N.Y.S.2d 
701 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005) the court found that "Inasmuch as claimant's inappropriate 
1
 Though the Board states it has been unable to find similar cases, this case is more akin 
to Delon v. LCR-MLimited Partnership, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 77573 (W.D. La 2006) 
wherein the federal district court ruled on a Motion to Strike Affidavit on the grounds 
that the affidavit was claimed to be hearsay. In denying the Motion to Strike, the court 
stated: 
Complaints filed by customers and co-workers constitute a legitimate, non-
discriminatory basis for termination. Arrington v. Southwestern Bell Telephone 
Co., 93 Fed. Appx. 593, 2004 WL 362239, *4 (5th Cir. 2004); Sarffv. 
Continental Express, 894 F.Supp. 1076 (S.D. Tex. 1995); Hooven-Lewis v. 
Caldera, 249 F.3d 259, 274 (4T Cir. 2001). LCR-M asserts that the evidence of 
the complaints, in the affidavit, is being offered not for the truth of the matter 
asserted, but to show that complaints were made and reported. Because the fact 
that the complaints were lodged is not being offered for truth, these statements 
are admissible. Id. at *4. 
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conduct towards customers was potentially detrimental to the employer's business, 
substantial evidence supports the decision of the Unemployment Insurance Appeal 
Board ruling that claimant's rude and unprofessional manner amounted to disqualifying 
misconduct." Id. See also, DuBois v. Commissioner of Labor, 19 A.D.3d 796, 796 
N.Y.S.2d 462 (N.Y. App. Div. 2005). 
These decisions are examples of where customer complaints have been the basis 
to deny unemployment benefits. Even in Utah, in Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, 972 P.2d 
395 (Utah 1998) the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that an employee can be terminated 
for customer complaints (at-will employment termination was not contrary to an express 
or implied contract nor public policy). 
As was cited by Prosper in its appellate brief, the cases of Law Offices of David 
Paul White & Assoc, v. Board of Review, 778 P.2d 21, 24 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) and 
Whipple v. Workforce Appeals Board, 2004 UT App 479 (Unpublished Opinion) are 
unemployment cases where the employee's poor performance and objectionable 
conduct resulted in a denial of benefits. 
As such, non-hearsay customer complaints can be grounds satisfying the 
requirements of a just cause discharge. This Court should apply a correction of error 
standard, and reverse the Board's decision awarding benefits. 
The Board states that whether an employer had just cause to terminate an employee is 
a mixed question of fact and law, and as such, a decision should not be disturbed unless 
it exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality. (B. at 1). This general standard 
of review in unemployment cases misstates the standard to be applied here. Hearsay is 
a question of law that is reviewed for correctness. State v. Olsen, 860 P.2d 332, 335 
(Utah 1993). " Tn reviewing [an agency's] interpretations of general questions of law, 
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III. ISSUES RAISED BY THE WORKFORCE APPEALS BOARD BRIEF. 
In addition to the argument that customer complaints are hearsay, the Board also 
raise a number of other issues in their brief. Prosper will respond to these issues in 
essentially the order presented: 
A. Due Process 
The Board in its brief (Point II, p. 22) states that "denying unemployment 
benefits on the alleged customer complaints without an opportunity to cross-examine 
those witnesses would deprive claimants of due process and defeat the provisions of the 
Unemployment Insurance Act and 60 years of court rulings in this state." (B. at 22). 
The Board also states in the Conclusion of its brief, that "Allowing the customer 
complaints for the truth of the matter asserted would deprive claimant of her due 
process rights." (B. at 30). This issue was previously raised by the Board and rejected: 
The Board argues that admitting customer complaints as non-hearsay under rule 
801(c), see Utah R. Evid. 801(c), violates Iversen's due process right to confront 
witnesses. [*** 11] We have already ruled that if evidence is presented for some 
purpose other than to prove the truth of the matter asserted, a party is not denied 
any due process rights when that evidence is admitted. See In re G.Y., 962 
P.2d 78, 86 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) ("Because the out-of-court statements were not 
admitted for the truth of the matter asserted, appellant was not denied any 
opportunity to confront or cross-examine the declarant.") (emphasis added). 
Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT App 281, ^13 fn.5, 168 
P.3d 344 (R. at 332, fn.5). 
It is therefore unclear why the Board raises the issue again. 
this Court applies a correction-of-error standard, with no deference to the expertise of 
the [agency].' "(alteration in original). Allen v. Department of Workforce Services 2005 
UTAppl86,l |6, 112P.3d 1238. 
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B. Possession of Evidence 
Utah Admin. Code R994-508-109(9) (2008) states: 
(9) Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not conforming to the rules 
of evidence, may be accepted and given its proper weight. A party has the 
responsibility to present all relevant evidence in its possession. When a party is 
in possession of evidence but fails to introduce the evidence, an inference may be 
drawn that the evidence does not support the party's position. 
While ignoring the fact that non-conforming evidence (hearsay evidence) is admissible 
in administrative hearings, the Board (Point III) cites to R994-508-109(9), to prescribe 
error to Prosper for failing to introduce evidence claimed to be in Prosper's 
"possession". The evidence that the Board asserts that Prosper possessed, but failed to 
present, is the complaining witnesses' testimony. The Board somehow illogically 
equates possession of the complaining witnesses' contact information with being "in 
possession" of the evidence such witnesses might have been able to provide. The Board 
argues "The employer 'was in possession' of the evidence since it knew the identity of 
the customers, had contact information for those customers, and could have called them 
as witnesses." (B. at 22). 
Not only is it not logical for the Board to assert that having "contact information" 
is the same as being "in possession" of evidence, but the Board then proceeds to draw 
inferences from Prosper's failure to present such witnesses that "any employer could 
say a claimant was discharged for customer complaints and not produce the customers" 
and employers "have a significant reason to misrepresent the facts." (B. at 23). Such 
inferences go well beyond the inferences contemplated in the Rule, and ascribes 
improper motives to employers. Such a conclusion also seeks to compel the 
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introduction of evidence to prove the substance of the complaints rather than relying on 
the existence of the complaints to establish just cause for discharge. As such, the 
argument that Prosper failed to present all the evidence "in its possession" is without 
merit. 
C. Firsthand Evidence 
The Board in its brief (Point IV) argues that none of Prosper's witnesses had 
any firsthand evidence that Iversen missed any sessions with customers. This assertion 
is troubling in light of the record. A review of the record establishes that Mr. Lorin 
Hardy, Iversen's direct supervisor, knew Iversen missed sessions and discussed this 
issue with her: 
Judge: Okay. Had you talked to her about missing appointments? 
Hardy: Every - 1 believe that, pretty much, every one of the instances that 
are documented on Exhibit 16 we did have a verbal conversation, if 
not via email and via the customer management system notes. 
Judge: Okay 
Hardy: Yes, we discussed these on a regular basis. 
Judge: Did she admit to missing appointments? 
Hardy: Yes. (R. at 094:6-18). 
3
 In (Point III) its brief, the Board also states that "the employer argues it would be 
unduly burdensome to call the customers as witnesses but does not explain why this is 
burdensome." Without conceding the point, this issue was not raised by Prosper in this 
appeal. 
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In an admission against interest, this firsthand testimony of Hardy was even confirmed 
by Iversen herself: 
Judge: Had they talked to you about missed appointments? 
Claimant: They had talked to me about specific clients-if a call came in or a 
client said that I had missed a session-it was- Lorin would ask me 
why I missed a session, or if I missed a session. (R. at 101:15-19). 
As such, it is perplexing for the Board to assert that Prosper's witnesses "had no 
firsthand evidence of missed sessions." 
D. New Evidence 
The Board in its brief (Point V), criticizes Prosper for allegedly introducing new 
evidence regarding emails. A review of the record establishes that the Board 
mischaracterizes Prosper's efforts to satisfy its marshaling obligation as an introduction 
of new evidence. 
As part of its obligation to marshal the evidence, Prosper identified those 
portions of the record that might support the Board's ruling. Then, as permitted by the 
Rule, Prosper proceeded to show how notwithstanding the marshaled evidence, the 
decision to award benefits is not supportable. 
In her testimony, Iversen suggested that one of the reasons why she was 
receiving so many complaints was that Prosper spelled her name wrong in her email 
address. Iversen presented no other evidence on this issue. Iversen gave no specific 
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examples of individuals that had complained about this issue nor did she identify 
whether she had informed Prosper of this problem. 
Under its marshaling obligation, Prosper needed to marshal this fact. But 
Prosper refuted this claim not by introducing new evidence, but rather, by pointing to 
those portions of the record that clearly establish that this issue is not what it is 
suggested to be. 
Iversen herself provided the ALJ a number of emails. (R. at 040-063). A simple 
review of those pages establishes that Iversen primary email address in her 
correspondence with her students was katrinaiversen@comcast.net. This is not new 
evidence. Marshaling the record to establish that conclusions are not supported by the 
record is not the introduction of new evidence. Furthermore, a discussion of Iversen's 
email address is only relevant if Prosper is trying to prove specific emails were not 
responded to. As such, the Board's criticism is misplaced. 
E. Business Records Under Utah Rules of Evidence 803(6) 
The Board in its brief (Point VI), rejects the notion that the customer complaints 
are admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 803(6) or the business records 
exception to the hearsay rule. In so concluding, the Board without citation states "The 
employer argues that customer complaints should be admitted into evidence under the 
business records exception to the hearsay rule. That would allow the complaints to be 
used for the truth of the matter asserted in those complaints, something that this court 
10 
has already rejected in its remand decision." (B. at 24). This statement is inaccurate for 
a number of issues. 
First, Rule 803(6) is an exception to the hearsay rule. If evidence fall within the 
definition of the business record exception, it is not hearsay, and can admitted for the 
truth of the matter asserted. 
Second, this Court did not "reject in its remand decision" that customer 
complaints could not be used for the truth of the matter asserted. Since hearsay 
evidence is admissible in administrative hearings, customer complaints can be admitted 
for the truth of the matter asserted, and given its proper weight. Mayes v. Department of 
Employment Sec., 754 P.2d 989, 992 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); See also Utah Admin. Code 
R994-508-109(9) (2008) ("Oral or written evidence of any nature, whether or not 
conforming to the rules of evidence, may be accepted and will be given its proper 
weight."). 
Third, the Court did not "reject in its remand decision" that the evidence was 
inadmissible as a business record. The Court reversed on other grounds, and 
specifically addressing 803(6) stated: 
Prosper also argues that the [***6] Board erred by misapplying the business 
records exception of the hearsay rule, see Utah R. Evid. 803(6), to the CMS 
spreadsheet. We conclude, however, that the direct testimony and the CMS 
spreadsheet were improperly excluded under rule 801(c), see id. 801(c), and 
therefore reverse on other grounds. Accordingly, it is unnecessary for us to 
consider whether the CMS spreadsheet constitutes an admissible business 
record (emphasis added). Prosper v. Department of Workforce Services, 2007 UT 
App 281,1J8 fn.3, 168 P.3d 344 (R. at 329, fii.3) 
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Therefore, as the Board did not consider the customer complaints under Rule 803(6) in 
its Decision on Remand, the Board has not decided all the issues required to be 
resolved. See Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(c)(2008). 
In rejecting Rule 803(6) as grounds to admit the business record, the Board cites 
to State v. Bertul, 664 P.2d 1181 (Utah 1983) regarding the admissibility of police 
reports. Whether Prosper's Customer Management System ("CMS") records 
substantively fall within an analysis similar to police records is yet to be decided. 
However, the language of Bertul cited by the Board seems to allow the CMS record to 
be used to establish the existence of the customer complaints. In Bertul, the court stated 
(referencing Rule 63(13) the predecessor of Rule 803(6)), "Thus, whether police reports 
are admissible depends on the nature of the records and the purpose for which they are 
offered. Police records of routine matters are admissible under Rule 63(13), such 
as the date a crime was reported." (Citation omitted) (emphasis added). Id at 1184. 
Following this logic, Prosper's CMS record of the date and type of complaint 
against Iversen is a record that is admissible under 803(6). A plain reading of the Rule 
leads to a similar conclusion: 
Records of regularly conducted activity. A memorandum, report, 
record, or data compilation, in any form, of acts, events, conditions, 
opinions or diagnoses, made at or near the time by . . . a person with 
knowledge, if kept in the course of a regularly conducted business 
activity, and if it was the regular practice of that business activity to 
make the . . . data compilation, all as shown by the testimony of the 
custodian or other qualified witness, unless the source of information 
or the method or circumstances of preparation indicate lack of 
trustworthiness . . . . Utah R. Evid. 803(6) 
12 
The introduction of the spreadsheet document from the CMS database cannot be 
viewed in a vacuum. The customer complaints were in an electronic database. In order 
to be available, some type of extraction and presentation was required.4 Unemployment 
hearings are informal. Neither party was represented by counsel. The four-part test 
outlined in Bertul was sufficiently satisfied to support Prosper's belief that it needed to 
discharge Iversen in order to protect its legitimate business interests.5 Viewed in this 
light, the CMS spreadsheet should have been admitted for this purpose as a business 
record under Rule 803(6) as an exception to the hearsay rule.6 
F. Marshaling Evidence 
The Board in its brief (Point VII) argues "The employer here has made no 
attempt to meet its marshaling burden." (R. at 29). Prosper respectfully cites to its brief, 
pages 20-29, for its marshaling of the evidence, and its explanation of how the 
4
 Even if the foundation for the introduction of the evidence was unartfully laid by the 
human resource manager, the rules governing the business record exception are to be 
construed broadly and generously construed in favor of admission. Klinger v. Kightly, 
889 P.2d 1372, 1377 fn. 9 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
5
 The Board also asserts that "the manager of human resources who prepared the 
complaint report for the hearing had no personal knowledge of the students or the 
complaints described in the report and knew little of the substance and particulars of the 
allegations." (B. at 27). Under the business records exception, "the person testifying 
need not have prepared the record nor have personal knowledge of the accuracy of the 
information contained in them." Hansen v. Heath, 852 P.2d 977, 981, fn. 17 (Utah 
1993)(citing affirmatively to Federal Rule of Evidence 803(6) in Wilson v. Zapata Off-
Shore Co., 939 F.2d 260, 272 (5th Cir. 1991)). 
6
 Additionally, the evidence is still admissible under the Department's Administrative 
Rules. See Utah Admin. Code R994-508-109(9)(2008) and R994-508-111(3)(2008). 
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marshaled evidence fails to support an award of benefits. The Board cites to no 
evidence that Prosper failed to marshal. The Board's assertion that Prosper "made no 
attempt to meet its marshaling burden" is without merit. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should reverse the Workforce Appeals 
Board's Decision on Remand awarding unemployment benefits to Iversen. There is 
sufficient admissible non-hearsay evidence to support the finding that Iversen was 
terminated for just cause. 
DATED this /9*3ay of June, 2008. 
Daniel J. Anderson 
Counsel for Appellant/Petitioner 
Prosper, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM 
FRANCES DELON VS. LCR-M LIMITED PARTNERSHIP 
DOCKET NO. 2:04 CV 1419 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF 
LOUISIANA, LAKE CHARLES DIVISION 
2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 77573 
October 23, 2006, Decided 
October 23, 2006, Filed 
SUBSEQUENT HISTORY: Motion granted by, in part, 
Motion denied by, in part Delon v LCR-M Ltd P'ship, 
2006 US Dist LEXIS 77579 (WD La, Oct 23, 2006) 
COUNSEL: [*1] For Frances Delon, Plaintiff Charles 
H Peckham, Lundy & Davis, Houston, TX, David H 
Hanchey, Lundy & Davis, Lake Charles, LA 
For L C R - M Limited Partnership, Defendant Thomas 
H Kiggans, Betty C Burke, Mary Ann Mitchell Felton, 
Phelps Dunbar et al, Baton Rouge, LA 
JUDGES: PATRICIA MINALDI, UNITED STATES 
DISTRICT JUDGE MAGISTRATE JUDGE WILSON 
OPINION BY: PATRICIA MINALDI 
OPINION 
MEMORANDUM ORDER 
Presently before the court is an "Objection to and 
Motion to Strike Affidavit of Dennis Arendt" [doc 35] 
This objection/motion was filed by the Plaintiff, Frances 
Delon ("Delon"), in opposition to an affidavit used by the 
Defendant, LCR-M Limited Partnership ("LCR-M"), in 
support of the Defendant's Motion for Summary Judg-
ment [doc 28] 
The Plaintiff objects to the admission of Arendt's af-
fidavit based on relevance and hearsay 
The Plaintiff claims that following statements are 
irelevant 
Arendt states i n P 3 that "I did not find 
her [Plaintiff] to be a pleasant person to 
work with I found her to be pushy and of-
ten confrontational" 
Arendt states in P 4 that "I did not 
believe that was true [an affair] but my 
problems with Ms Delon had nothing to 
do with [*2] her belief that they were 
having an affair" 
Delon argues that these statements by Arendt are ir-
relevant because he was a counter employee, not a su-
pervisor Delon argues that Arendt cannot give an opin-
ion as to whether being "pushy and confrontational" was 
a good or bad sales attribute 
MCR-M asserts that there is undisputed evidence 
that one of the two primary reasons for the Plaintiffs 
termination was poor working relationships with co-
workers and her supervisor, the nature of which Delon 
candidly admitted ' The affidavit of Arendt is one of 
four affidavits by co-workers offered in support of LCR-
M's defense that Delon was terminated, in part, because 
of poor relationships with co-workers 
1 Deposition of Delon at pp 157-60, 168, 174-
176, 235-45, 252-54, 268-72, 277-78) Attached 
to LCR-M's Motion for Summary Judgment [doc 
28] 
Personality conflicts constitute a legitimate ground 
for termination ' Accordingly, Arendt's testimony that he 
found the Plaintiff to be pushy and confrontational is 
[*3] relevant 
2 See Sarffv Continental Express, 894 F Supp 
1076 (SD Tex 1995), Hoov en-Lewis v C alder a, 
249 F 3d 259, 274 (4th Cir 2001), Vore v Indi-
ana Bell Telephone Co, 32 F3d 1161 (7th Cir 
1994), Jackson v City ofKilleen, 654 F 2d 1181, 
1183 (5th Cir 1981), Caro v City of Dallas 17 
FSupp 2d 618 626 (ND Tex 1998) 
The statements Delon finds objectionable based on 
hearsay are as follows 
1 
ADDENDUM 
. "I know of customers who had similar 
problems with her [Plaintiff] and some re-
fused to deal with her." 
. "I occasionally reported these prob-
lems to Bobby Soileau." 
. "I was also aware of complaints 
about Ms. Delon from other employees 
and customers prior to her allegation of 
this affair." 
Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 801 (c) states that 
"Hearsay" is a statement, other than one made by the 
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered 
in evidence [*4] to prove the truth of the matter asserted. 
While the Plaintiff argues that these statements are hear-
say, LCR-M counters that, because one of the reasons 
Delon was terminated was because of the excessive 
number of customer complaints filed against her, Ar-
endt's testimony that he knew of complaints being filed is 
admissible. 
Complaints filed by customers and co-workers con-
stitute a legitimate, non-discriminatory basis for termina-
tion. 3 LCR-M asserts that the evidence of the com-
plaints, in the affidavit, is being offered not for the truth 
of the matter asserted, but to show that complaints were 
made and reported. Because the fact that the complaints 
were lodged is not being offered for truth, these state-
ments are admissible. Accordingly, 
3 Arrington v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co., 
93 Fed. Appx. 593, 2004 WL 362239, *4 (5th Cir. 
2004); Sarff, 894 F. Supp. 1076\ Hooven-Lewis, 
294F3dat274. 
IT IS ORDERED that the Plaintiffs Objection to 
and Motion to Strike the Affidavit [*5] of Dennis Ar-
endt IS DENIED. 
Lake Charles, Louisiana, this 23 day of October, 
2006. 
PATRICIA MINALDI 
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 
2 
